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INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS AND SHARING INFORMATION :
AN EXPERT POINT OF VIEW
Frederic MASSON - Jean-Philippe PINEAU
INERIS - Parc Technologique Alata - B.P. 2 - 60550 VERNEUIL EN HALATTE - France
SUMMARY
Accidents are taken into account in risk assessment and shall be a basis for knowledge to be
considered for improving the safety level at the design and Operation stages in various
industries and activities. Unförtunately, in many cases, detailed data are difficult to be
accessed. Lessons learnt from French accidents in plants and transportation will be developed.
In summaries of accidents issued after analysis, emphasis will be given on the need to
consider product(s), process, causes, circumstances, evolution and consequences. Examples
will be detailed on involved materials and products, on accidental phenomenon, on the general
design of a plant or transportation system, on the reliability of safety related equipment, on
procedures and on operator's role.
INTRODUCTION
For long, very large accidents occurred in explosive factories. Later, accidents were reported
in flour mills (end of 18th Century), in mines (coal dust and firedamp explosions), in chemical
plants, during the transportation ofdangerous goods such äs fertilizers, explosives ... or even
with very common substances such äs fuels or grain.
In all cases, the consequences could be more or less extended : thermal effects from fire, toxic
gas and fire fumes releases, toxic Spills in soil and water.
Especially, when the extension of damage was large and when people died, various enquiries
were undertaken :
• at the Company level for a better understanding of the deficiencies of plant design and
Operation including human factor, management and maintenance
• at competent authorities level for investigating the causes and for improving the existing
regulation
• at the insurance Company level for defining the extent of the damages to be paid and for
reevaluating the insurance premium for a given plant, industrial field or technical system ...
Thus, investigations to be carried out have various goals, but the methodology could be the
same. This paper is given äs an attempt to summarize the experience gained by INERIS (and
formerly CERCHAR) experts when accidents occumng with daneeious substances took place
in a variety of plants and Systems.
In general, this experience is based on direct investigation and analysis of accidents.
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PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN THE DOMAIN
Existing data could be collected from press dispatches, general and technical newspapers,
official reports ...
The reports on accidents are rarely published when the investigation is done by insurance
companies or the operator of the plant in which the accident occurred. As regards the
competent authorities, efforts were made for long to draw statistics and make detailed data
available. The Directory ofexisting databases prepared by ESReDA could be considered äs an
attempt for networking the databases operators and users. Other initiatives are currently in
progress : a special group of European Process Safety Center (EPSC) dealing with accident,
the networking of data related to dangerous substances under the aegis of EPA in USA. Data
collection forms were prepared by OECD and UN/ECE, by MARS databases operators and by
many databases operators. The differences alreading existing should be made äs minor äs
possible to ease the exchange and use of information.
However, for data exchange, there is a need to be sure that the analysis of the accident was
reliably undertaken.
This lecture will present the various Steps of the investigation of an accident and the lessons
learnt from various accidents.
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS
Logical steps for investigating and analysing an accident are the followin^
1. characteristics of the plant or System in which the accident occurred,
2. collection ofdata on damages, testimonies, analysis ofsamples,
3. definition ofthe Operation when accident occurred,
4. consideration of all possible accident scenarios,
5. plausibility ofa scenario.
Characteristics of the plant or System
Any Information about the exact location of the plant (system) involved, other plants,
buildings and communication routes in the vicinity, the Operation procedures when the
accident occured, the types of products involved (if relevant), the presence and location of
operators or other persons, are to be collected. At this stage, preventive and protective
measures, existing regulations and codes of practices, emergency response should also be
reported. In many instances, emergency response data collected can give valuable information
about the development of an accident, the effectiveness of preventive and protective measures,
but can also explain some major modifications ofthe plant System before the investigation by
experts.
Data on damages and testimonies. sarnpling
Observation of damages is to be done äs soon äs possible, and if possible during the
development ofthe phenomenon.
Any injury and its consequences (immediate, mid- or long-term effects), fatalities and
ecological effects, are to be reported clearly including the locations and the exact dates.
Photos, video films, witnesses Interviews, distribution of fall-outs and missiles, plumes
distribution after releases shall be collected to be considered later.
Samples shall be collected for further investigations about toxicity, combustibility,
explosivity ... even modified substances or construction materials can be interesting äs a proof
ofthe fire development, thermal effects, involved materials ...
Definition ofthe Operation ofthe system when accident occurred
A lot of accident investigations proved that the System was neither designed nor operated in
the conditions in which it was supposed to be. Any investigation must consider the exact
design and Operation ofthe System, the maintenance, the training ofoperator, the application
of operating procedures and the management system, the possible interaction of third parties
(passengers in transport Systems), the staff actions, the exact nature of products (if relevant),
the monitoring system (human or technical) and shall lead to a definition of the state of the
System (with existing uncertainties) and should be related to the other data collected.
All possible accident scenarios
At this stage, no consideration is to be paid to the likelihood of occurrence of the sequence of
events which constitute the possible accident scenarios.
The possible scenarios may be chosen from a preexisting list based on the possible
phenomena related to the use of hazardous substances, or to the materials present in buildings
or transportation vehicies. Mechanical effects from pressure vessels or Containers under
pressure, from Operation of plant, should also be considered äs potential scenarios : collision,
derailment, sudden engulfment by fires or by fire fumes in a building. Only the main
characteristics of scenarios are to be taken into consideration. In a further step, the causes and
sequences of events related to these scenarios will be reported, checked and evaluated.
Some damages and testimonies can prove the likelihood of a scenario (bursting of a vessel or
building for explosion, thermal effects with flame for fire, visible colored smoke for releases).
At this stage, the collection of data from past accidents and incidents in the plant (system) or
in similar plants and/or with similar products, can induce some ideas about the sequence of
events.
For flirther investigations, an event tree for the considered damage or for a given phenomenon
can be established.
Two examples are given thereafter (figures l and 2) in which damages from pressure effects
were obtained.
In such event trees, comparison with facts and damages, Operation conditions, products
involved can focus the attention on the most logical and plausible scenarios.
Plausibility of a scenario
In the two previous examples of explosion, the characteristics of products involved, the
modelling of the phenomenon for defining the pressure levels are to be considered. In other
cases, the thermal effects for fires, the gas or liquid releases flow caiculations, and the
dispersion effects can explain the extent of damages.
When results of tests or modelling are obtained, they shall be compared with data collected.
Such analysis is examplified in the summary reports of two recent accidents (see annexes l
and 2).
LESSONS LEARNT FROM ACCIDENTS
INERIS experts were directiy involved in the following field investigations :
• an unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE) in a füel depot at St Herblain,
October 7, 1991 (J.F. Lechaudel et al., 1995) with one fatality and extensive damages
outside the depot premises
• another major UVCE in the TOTAL refinery's fluid catalytic cracking unit at La Mede
(November 9, 1992) (P. Michaelis et al., 1995) with 6 fatalities and 2 billion francs damage
• confined explosion in a grain silo, Blaye in 1997, 11 fatalities, l injured and extensive
damages (F. Masson. 1998)
• confined gas explosion in a plant connected to a flare Stack (J.F. Lechaudel et al., 1998)
• a fire in a fuel depot at St Ouen. June 1991, with 15 fire fighters injured and the evacuation
of 1.000 persons
• ammoniac accident release (30 tons) in a chemical plant at Mazingarbe when unloading a
railtank (December 16, 1994) (J.F. Lechaudel et al., 1998)
• fire and explosion following derailment ofunleaded fuel railtanks on August 13, 1993 in
LaVoulte. 1.000 persons evacuated
• fire in a NPK ternary fertilizer storage, Nantes, in 1987. 30.000 persons evacuated.
Most of these investigations were carried out at the request of French competent authorities,
the rest directiy for industrial firms.
Further details on other accidents investigated, either in chemical industries or in other
industries are given elsewhere (J.P. Pineau et al., 1993).
From these accidents, many lessons can be drawn, either for the general design or the
Operation ofthe System, or on the efficacy ofexisting safety measures.
These fleld investigations allowed to draw some general assumptions.
The accidents at St Herblain (fuel depot) and La Mede (refinery) pointed out the influence of
the location of ignition sources when flammable gases can be released and the absolute
requisite of the definition of dangerous areas for choosing the adapted equipment.
The fire in the St Ouen fuel depot emphasized the role of repair and maintenance works and
some difficulties for closing valves during fire fighting, mainly in relationship with the
design.
A gram dust explosion äs in Blaye, a rare occurrence with so extended damages and fatalities
is dealing with dust, a by-product in grain elevators. The extension of fatalities is related to
the location of offices and to the design of confined premises in which the explosion can
propagate.
The case of Nantes accident (fertilizers) is an illustration of a dangerous release oftoxic fümes
from a fire and the necessary emphasis to be paid to proper distribution of goods in storages
and use of adapted fire fighting methods.
The railtank accident in La Voulte is dealing with a transportation accident for which the
geographical location ofthe occurrence can play a major role : explosion in a sewage System
and pollution ofthe drinking water System.
The emission of toxic gases äs in Mazingarbe and the explosion in a plant connected to a flare
Stack could be considered äs an Illustration of accidents in which the use of safety measures
was not analyzed regarding their functionality and dependability : safety Systems for avoiding
releases in the first case and the running ofutilities in the second case had poor reliability.
Within the cases of these accidents, only technical aspects were dealt with either for the
design stage or for the Operation stages in which safety measures are to be used. An
improvement of the Situation can only be obtained if the same level of experience is shared
between manufacturers and designers of equipment and the users. This could be based on a
risk analysis in which the intended use of the equipment (generally included in a process or a
plant) is adequately defined, äs well äs the potential accidental scenarios with the hazardous
zones concerned and the use of safety measures (including their reliability).
But more emphasis should be paid on organisational measures (safety management) and
human behaviour.
All these aspects being dealt with, they could be introduced in a database in which a summary
report can be the basis for further use.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of accidents needs an understanding of intended use and Operation procedures of
a System or equipment or plants. The identification of possible accidental scenarios is a
prerequisite. Existing databases are helpfül for risk analysis when such analysed data are
collected. The structuration of data shall be the result of a process in which a plausible
scenario is defined after due consideration of all facts reported during the investigation
(Operation conditions, witnesses reports, damages ...) to be faced to a sequence of events
leading to the accident, the various sequences ofphenomena being modelised and/or tested.
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Annex
Channel Tunnel fire
November 1996
The System
This tunnel consists in two running tunnels, 50 kms long, The Ventilation is obtained through
air injection in various locations from the service gallery.
In all cases, this service gallery is a safe haven for the evacuation of passengers and crew
members. An overpressure of fresh air is always in existence in this gallery.
Facts on accident
Fire occurred in a heavy goods vehicies shuttle (HGV), induced a stop in a running tunnel and
caused major damage to a section ofthe running tunnel and its equipment.
About 700 m long, concrete structure of the tunnel was to be rebuilt in the zone where the
maximum heat flux was 350 MW ; 27 people were evacuated in the service gallery from the
amenity coach where HGV drivers were locaded and from the locomotive without suffering
too much influence from the fire fumes.
Immediate cause
Fire in the HGV shuttle was detected and reported by people located in the open-air premises
ofthe tunnel, before the shuttle enters the tunnel.
Underlying causes
Underlying causes for aggravating the consequences ofthis fire were numerous. Among them,
the following should be pointed out:
• the logics used to trigger an alarm and actions from the railway centre needed to be
reconsidered
• the use of a supplementary Ventilation System for the avoidance of fire fumes around the
amenity coach where lorry drivers were located was rather late
• the complexity of emergency procedures.
Annex 2
Grain dust explosion in a silo
August 20 th,1997
Type of plant
In a grain elevator (port silo along the Gironde river), under Operation (unloading grain from
lorries and moving grain from a cell to another storage area through a conveyor belt), an
explosion occurred.
Facts on accident
The explosion induced the collapse ofmore than half the 44 silos cells (30 m high and 6 m in
diameter, storing wheat, barley and maize), and ofthe working tower, with blow out of debris
100 m around ; 11 people were killed and l injured. Minor damages to neighbouring houses
occurred : glass breakages.
Immediate cause
The immediate cause of this explosion is still unknown, but reports from witnesses proved
that the explosion initiated at the top ofthe working tower. Due to possible accidental release
ofdust from centralised dust collection System, it is supposed that the explosion initiated there
and propagated to some cells, the working tower and other parts of the silo
The investigation proved no evidence of seif heating of stored grain, excluding the formation
ofan explosive atmosphere ofpyrolysed gas from grain stored in cells.
Extended damage does not allow to define the nature and location of the ignition source of
grain dust air mixture. Friction through mechanical shocks in the Ventilator upstream of the
bag filters, or seif ignition in the dust collection chamber are suspected. The equipment was
located in the upper storeys ofthe working tower.
Underlying causes
The propagation of the explosion in concrete confined structures was at the origin of their
collapse of concrete structures. Location ofoffices in these concrete premises, too dose to silo
cells, was an aggravating factor and the cause of fatalities of people not directiy related to the
Operation ofthe silo.
Dust was collected through bag filters collected to a dust chamber. The non enclosed bags
were located at the top of the working tower. Such a device should be avoided.
Recommendation
Revision of the French legislation on grain storage (dated 1983) which will imply a risk
assessment.
